The CPSU in Congress by Davies, Dave
Dave Davies
The CPSU in Congress
THE 24th CONGRESS of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union brought 4,963 delegates to Moscow from all corners of the 
vast and varied Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Congress 
reached all its decisions unanimously —  a remarkable achievement 
when one considers the weighty and complex questions before the 
gathering.
The period between the Congresses had seen such events as the 
intervention in Czechoslovakia, the armed clashes with China, war 
in the Middle East, big developments in Vietnam and talks on 
disarmament. On the home front there had been the economic 
reforms, clashes in the field of literature and art and the delaying 
of the Congress for a year beyond the term laid down in the Party 
rules. The Congress elected a Central Committee of 241 members 
and changed the Party rules to provide for Congresses every five 
years instead of four. Yet the Congress was able to decide 
unanimously “fully and completely to approve the political line 
and practical activities of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
and to approve the propositions and conclusions contained in the 
Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU”. The same 
resolution, incidentally, stated that “The Soviet people whole­
heartedly and unanimously support the Party’s home and foreign 
policy".
There were present 102 foreign delegations from 91 countries. 
CPSU General secretary L. I. Brezhnev added a new dimension 
to unanimity when he stated in his concluding speech to the
Congress:
We were once again able to convince ourselves th a t the  foreign comrades 
unanim ously approve the  course of our party , its p rincip led  m arxist-leninist 
line in I he world Com m unist movement
The inaccuracy of this claim is obvious without even studying 
the speeches of the foreign delegations, some of whom politely 
spelled out the fact that there were differences. But the fact that 
the claim was made indicates the importance attached to inter­
national support for CPSU policies and the large attendance of 
foreign parties. About 90 Communist Parties were represented
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including parties not present at the 1969 International Meeting of 
Communist and Workers’ Parties, such as those of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, Korea and Japan.
Other parties attending generally came into the categories of 
socialist, nation-liberation, or nationalist parties. Some examples 
were the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the Laotian 
Patriotic Front, Socialist Parties from Japan and Chile, the Arab 
Socialist League from the UAR and Ba’ath parties from Irak and 
Syria. International gatherings of anti^imperialist forces can be of 
value, but a number of factors tended to reduce the usefulness of 
the CPSU Congress as an international forum. Speeches were rather 
formal, couched in jargon and coded remarks. Appreciated by the 
Soviet party leaders and delegates were condemnation of China, 
expressions of fidelity to “proletarian internationalism based on 
marxism-leninism” and pledges to fight “anti-Sovietism”. Not so 
well received were calls for “proletarian internationalism based on 
mutual respect, equality, and non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs” or statements implying that the party in question 
had good relations with the Chinese Communist Party.
Yet justified criticisms concerned with national interest and the 
seeking of hegemony should not obscure certain realities about 
the USSR, which were reflected by the large international atten­
dance at the CPSU Congress. At the least, the existence of the 
USSR as a counterweight to the United States gives much greater 
scope to movements for national liberation, for peace and for 
socialism.
Revolutionaries gain nothing by writing off the USSR as an 
anti-imperialist force or by seeing their way forward per medium 
of denouncing the Soviet Union, a diversion which, like its opposite, 
detracts from the central task of developing a viable strategy for 
socialist revolution in one’s own country. Yet the latter involves 
making an independent assessment of the USSR and stating one’s 
opinion appropriately.
The 24th Congress in general could be described as a stabilising, 
balancing Congress, seeking to maintain the status quo in the 
leadership and to curb various “extreme” trends which could 
upset the equilibrium of the present set-up. As such, the Congress 
reflected the absence of a sharp political or economic crisis within 
the country and indeed a certain confidence (with qualifications) of 
the leadership. Certainly there were no abrupt turns in policy 
or sensational leadership changes. The only changes in the Polit­
buro, for example, were an extra four members raising the number 
on that body to 15, with no-one being dropped.
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An important factor in the relative political stability of the 
USSR is the continuing development of the economy, with a 
gradual rise in living standards. The 10 year period since I had 
last been in the USSR, for example, had brought a number of 
positive changes.
There are changes which can be seen even by the superficial 
observer. Certainly Moscow is not the USSR but it is fair to say 
that the virtual absence of the previously large proportion of 
shabbily dressed people —  particularly elderly, reflects progress 
which is taking place throughout the country. Evident too is the 
outward growth of Moscow and the replacement of old areas by 
modern flats. Shopping is a little better, but is still a time-consuming 
process. There are a number of new, apparently efficient self-service 
stores but not enough.
Two of the most significant changes in the last 10 years have 
been the change from the 6-day to 5-day working week, (hours are 
close to 40 per week) and a relatively large rise in the minimum 
wage. In the last Five-year Plan period, for example, the minimum 
wage rose from 40 to 60 roubles per month. (A rouble is virtually 
equivalent to an Australian dollar at official rates.) Prices by and 
large appear to have remained stable. Some obsolescent consumer 
goods have been reduced in price. The most outstanding price 
rise is that on hard liquor, with vodka going up from three to four 
roubles a bottle and cognac soaring to extremely high prices. This 
was a purely administrative measure to combat heavy drinking. 
Casual conversations with ordinary people indicated to me a 
general recognition that materially life was better, although there 
are complaints about shortages, prices, and the difficulties of shop- 
ing for quality goods.
Underlying the rise in living standards has been a considerable 
increase in the industrial level of the country. Examination of the 
economic statistics show that the Soviet Union has one of the 
highest growth rates in the world, although many targets set 
down in the Program of the CPSU and in the directives for the 
Five-year Plan 1966-70 were not attained.
But for all the economic achievements, the prestige of the 
Soviet Union as a harbinger of a new way of life, an inspiration 
for revolutionaries, has in the main declined. This has occurred in 
spite of Soviet aid to, for example, Vietnam and, Cuba both of 
which have fired the hearts of revolutionaries and progressives 
throughout the world. And imperialist propaganda aided by the 
“ revisionists” do not account for the decline in attractiveness and 
prestige, especially in advanced capitalist countries. This aspect
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is highlighted by the fact that although the United States maintains 
its clear lead in material production, the kind of society in that 
country increasingly appals people throughout the world. No longer 
do rightwing spokesmen point to the United States as the beacon 
for other capitalist countries —  on the contrary it has become 
the world's awful example. On the other hand, masses of people 
in the west know that the Soviet Union has made considerable 
progress in living standards, science, education and social services 
but in general are not attracted by the Soviet model of socialism.
The external attitude to the USSR runs parallel with attitudes 
inside the country. Certainly in the USSR one meets many very 
fine people. The high level of culture among considerable sections 
of the population is impressive, reflecting as it does high standards 
of education. But the full potential of the socialist economic base 
is not being realised. Labor morale clearly leaves a great deal 
to be desired and is the subject of a big campaign in the mass 
media. There is a heavy emphasis on efficiency, increased sense 
of responsibility and improved labor discipline. Alongside the 
understandable and justified desire of Soviet people for better 
material living standards after decades of shortages there is a 
pre-occupation with everyday affairs, with the acquisition of 
consumer goods and a considerable apathy towards politics. These 
trends seem to be more marked among industrial workers than 
among intellectuals.
Within the general stability reflected by the Congress, there 
are clearly areas of concern to the CPSU leadership. There is a 
certain anxiety that the rise in living standards should continue, 
since this is an important factor in a general acceptance of policy. 
The events in Poland last December clearly made an impression 
in other countries and while nothing on that scale has taken place 
in the USSR, there are reports of relatively minor upsets in some 
provincial towns on economic questions. There was a considerable 
emphasis on consumer goods at the Congress, as well as a 
number of speeches from “rank-and-file” Party members thanking 
the Central Committee of the CPSU for their “constant concern 
for the welfare of the workers”.
The “Balanced” nature of the CPSU 24th Congress is well 
illustrated by attitudes to past Congresses, notably the confirmation 
of the 20th Congress of 1956 and the pointed omission of specific 
mention of the 22nd Congress of 1961. Re-affirmation of the 
20th Congress is a welcome sign and an answer to speculation 
that Stalin was to be “re-habilitated”. B|ut this too must be 
qualified. Re-affirmation of the 20th Congress was made at an
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interesting point in Brezhnev’s report —  in the section dealing with 
Soviet relations with China. He said: “ It will be recalled that the 
Chinese leaders have put forward an ideological political platform 
of their own which is incompatible with Leninism on key questions 
of international life and the world communist movement and have 
demanded that we should abandon the line of the 20th Congress 
and the Program of the CPSU . . . Our party has resolutely opposed 
the attempts to distort Marxist-Leninist teaching . . .”
The choice of this point to reassert the 20th Congress may 
indicate a certain compromise, since it arises here in a defensive 
way and without elaboration of the historic significance of that 
Congress. The trend of the present leadership is to keep the 
“thaw” and the ferment in Soviet politics which characterised 
the late fifties and early sixties within definite limits.
The CPSU Program was re-affirmed in a similar back-handed 
way. It was adopted at the 22nd Congress when the unmentionable 
Nikita Sergeivitch Krushchov was in the leadership and is 
very much played down these days. It might be remarked in passing 
that the retention of the Program, in a half-hearted way but 
without amendment is yet another example of the Congress policy 
of letting sleeping dogs lie, because there are some sections of the 
Program clearly requiring revision, even from the point of view 
of current policies. For example, the Program states:
In the  cu rrcn t decade (1961-70) the Soviet U nion, in trea tin g  the  m aterial
and technical basis of communism, will surpass th e  strongest and richest
capitalist country, the  U.S.A., in p roduction  per head of population  . . .
There are other similar references, as well as specific figures 
for production targets which have not been achieved or clearly 
cannot be achieved. And this is without debating the vital question 
of whether the emphasis should be on the quantitative competition 
with capitalism or on the building of a qualitatively new system 
of human relations.
Throughout the Congress, the policies followed under 
Krushchov were referred to by the code word “subjectivism” or 
"subjective errors” . And the complete obliteration of all traces of 
the person of Krushchov is little short of miraculous when one 
recalls the historic contribution of that remarkable man in the 
decade after Stalin’s death when he was THE top leader.
The name of Krushchov has been erased because, in spite of 
weaknesses, he was the man closely associated with “the thaw” 
that period in Soviet history which saw a rise of great hopes for 
the future of socialism, a mass stirring which was a promise for 
democratisation but a threat to bureaucracy. Figuratively speaking,
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the former inmates whom he gave the job of dismantling Stalin’s 
labor camps were getting ideas that other structures too were of a 
restrictive character and had to go.
Although it was promised by the new leadership that his policies 
would be continued, changes were made. Sobriety was restored 
to some areas where it was needed (maize was put back into its 
right place) but this was accompanied by other changes. A symbolic 
example. The 22nd Congress decided (unanimously) on the erection 
on Red Square of a monument to the victims of the “personality 
cult”. No such monument is yet to be seen. But a granite bust of 
Stalin stands on a pedestal over his grave by the Kremlin wall 
behind the Lenin mausoleum alongside other past prominent 
Soviet leaders.
Literature and art are sensitive areas in Soviet politics and 
pronouncements on these subjects are often a guide to general 
policies. The key paragraph in Brezhnev’s speech in the section on 
literature and art was:
However, we m ust no t lose sight of the fact th a t in  the  developm ent of our 
a rt there have been com plicating factors. T here  were some who sought to 
reduce th e  diversity of present-day Soviet reality  to problem s th a t have 
irreversibly receded in to  the  past as a result of work done by th e  party  to 
overcome the consequences of the  personality cult. A nother extrem e current 
among individual w riters was an a ttem pt to whitewash past phenom ena which 
the party  had subjected to  em phatic  and princip led  criticism, and to conserve 
ideas and views contravening the  new, creative elem ents which the party  
has in troduced in to  its practical and theoretical work in  recent years.
The first trend referred of course to such writers as Solzhenitsyn 
and it was no surprise that here and in other references they were 
condemned. But the criticism of the other “extreme current” — 
interpreted as referring in particular to the die-hard Stalinist 
Kochetov —  is of interest. It is a further indication of the desire 
of the CPSU leadership to maintain a balance, to avoid if possible 
literary scandals of which they have had more than enough in 
recent times. Some satisfaction at the criticism of the extreme 
Stalinists and the “balance” is justified, but the nature of the 
balance must be kept in mind. That is, art and literature are 
obviously still to be the subject of official edict and censorship. 
And the line of going quiet on Stalin is part of a general trend of 
emphasising the continuity of Soviet history, ironing out and glossing 
over the sharp changes and “distortions” .
Criticism of two extremes in the Brezhnev report does not mean 
that both will be treated equally in practice. Ultra-conservatives such 
as Kochetov and Shevtsov are published, are not expelled from the 
Writers’ Union and are not subject to the kind of vitriolic press 
articles directed against Solzhenitsyn. The future may see some
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curbing of the ultras in the interests of cooling debate, but not 
their suppression or persecution.
In addition, the comfort in the Brezhnev report tended to be 
iced over by the subsequent speeches of two writers Mikhail 
Sholokhov and Alexander Chakovsky. It was rather tragic to see 
a talented writer like the former acting the demagogue, including 
in cheap jibes against the Austrian marxist Ernst Fischer and 
putting in commercials about royalties on books written long ago. 
But his hard line did not lose him his place on the Central Com­
mittee.
Editor of Literaturnaya Gazette A. Chakovsky stated agreement 
with the “profound evaluation” of the situation given by L. I. 
Brezhnev, but went on to take a harsh, authoritarian line. He 
became an alternative member of the C.C. So that if these two 
men are to be the leaders of the literary establishment, any hopes 
stemming from Brezhnev’s ostensibly balanced remarks must be 
qualified.
What, then, has happened to the “thaw”? Certainly there is 
little chance of a return to full-fledged Stalinism, although the list 
of people imprisoned or exiled for political dissent is long and 
growing. Progress continues in a number of ways, despite diffi­
culties. Solzhenitsyn, for example, was expelled from the Writers’ 
Union, condemned in vitriolic terms in the official press —  even 
linked with foreign reaction. His books are not published and 
former works are removed from libraries. Yet he continues to 
write, supported by people like the celebrated ‘cellist Mstislav 
Rostropovitch. His works are widely read in Samizdat (typed 01 
roneoed copies). Rostropovitch was confined to the Soviet Union 
for a period for his espousal of Solzhenitsyn’s cause, but as far 
as is known, no other reprisals have been taken.
A bi-monthly journal The Chronicle of Current Events has been 
coming out regularly since late 1968 in Moscow and it must be 
ass'umed that the authorities know who is responsible. Apparently 
the consequences of closing it down are too high a price to pay 
for the advantage gained. It is, of course, true that scientists get 
a certain latitude because of their importance in the economy, but 
public opinion is undoubtedly a factor. People’s hopes cannot be 
kindled and easily doused.
What is the future for democratic transformation in the USSR?
I have yet to read or hear a coherent and convincing answer to 
this question. The official Soviet view that everything is being 
done by the Party to ensure the development of socialist democracy 
does not convince in view of the clashes in this area, and the fact
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that the Party leadership itself is immune from public criticism.
But the lack of widespread debate in the Soviet Union among 
those with views different from those of the leadership has meant 
that only scrappy, often naive views of the future are produced. 
All that can be done here is to sketch some of the political, 
economic and social forces pressing for change and those resisting, it.
Some observers place their hopes on the younger generation 
who are well-educated, and who it is hoped, will not fit in with 
bureaucracy, with restrictions, but will see that the development 
of their country calls for free and open discussion of all questions. 
Rising levels of education are not compatible with lists of banned 
books or grandiloquent speeches full of “unbreakables” “indest- 
ructibles” and “eternals” . In practice, bans and taboos are often 
ignored. As already pointed out, strict enforcement of these would 
lead to severe dislocation of the country’s economic and social 
life. In particular, the sciences cannot develop within a straight- 
jacket of a rigid official ideology (known by the acronym of “diamat”) 
and shades of Lysenkoism.
Such hopes for the young generation have a good foundation, 
but other factors operate to take the edge off the young generation 
as a force for democratic change. One factor for conformism and 
conservatism comes from progress itself. A growing proportion of 
young intellectuals come from families of industrial workers and 
peasants and the resultant social lift partially at least engenders 
acceptance of the status quo. In addition, the Soviet education 
system, good as it is, is not distinguished by its encouragement of 
independent thought and debate. Cynicism is also widespread. 
After all, no-one earns a good living by disagreeing with the chiefs. 
And even if what you learn in “diamat” lessons is not much use 
at chemistry lectures it is worth your while to pass in “diamat” 
and to be able to use the phraseology when required. This is 
without mentioning the strong direct pressures put on people to 
conform. These tend to fragment, even atomise those with dissenting 
views who disagree with each other on what course to take.
The censored press produces some peculiar effects among people 
with disagreements with the present leadership. While remaining 
firm socialists (it is ridiculous to suggest that the “dissidents” favor 
a return to capitalism or are ideological agents of the imperialists) 
some tend to react one-sidedly to propaganda and begin to believe 
the opposite of what they are told. Hence some of the naive ideas 
about life under capitalism, since in rejecting the exaggerations 
some reject much of the truth. They are thus ill-equipped to cope 
with the reality of the advanced capitalist countries, whether
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observed directly or through the distorting lens of the BBC or 
Voice of America. Lack of information and debate severely hampers 
their ability to formulate a realistic program.
Deeply entrenched methods of working and thinking which 
thrive in conditions of restricted debate are a powerful conservative 
force. It has been suggested that this was an important factor in 
depriving the economic reforms of some of their force. Carrying 
out directives and plans handed down from a central ministry 
and earning a bonus for fulfilment feels safe. More responsibility 
and initiative in the hands of local managers and executives means 
venturing into the unknown. Link this feeling with the reluctance 
of top bodies to delegate functions and progress is difficult.
In any society the middle levels of the bureaucracy are a con­
servative force and this appears to be the case in the USSR. A 
transition to a selfmanaging society, free from petty controls and 
censorship would mean the loss of power and some privilege of an 
important stratum and in the meantime, the top leaders rely on 
this stratum for the everyday running of affairs. Some say that the 
power of the middle bureaucracy is decisive and cite examples 
of necessary, progressive decisions from on top being bogged down 
on the way to full enactment. While there is something in this 
view, I feel it is exaggerated, involving among other things the 
old Russian belief that the man on top is allright —  it’s his under­
lings who are the trouble.
“Bureaucracy” is often criticised in the USSR when it gums up 
the works, and makes blunders. Muddlers, those associated with 
red tape, minor or middle officials who are pompous or inhuman 
towards the public, petty snobs —  come in for stiff criticism in 
the press and particularly in satirical journals such as Krokodil. 
Top leaders can get a round of applause at Congresses for words 
of criticism of the petty bureaucrat. But they themselves are im­
mune. It is here in the Central Committee and particularly the 
Politbureau that the real bureaucracy —  the rule of those in office 
— and the real power resides.
Speculation naturally arises as to whether change can be initiated 
from this direction. Could another Khrushchov come forward, 
perhaps in conditions of a difficult situation requiring serious 
change? No-one should wish a crisis situation on the Soviet Union 
in the hope of positive change, as there is no guarantee of change 
proceeding this way. It may be some time before the future 
becomes clearer. For the present, further development of the 
processes already under way is the most likely course. The 24th 
Congress of the CPSU did little to change this situation.
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